The number that was not in the debt line
Oracle's most recent quarterly report contains a figure that does not appear anywhere in its debt line. At the end of May 2026 the company had 273.3 billion dollars, roughly 253 billion euros, of contractual obligations tied to AI infrastructure. Four years earlier the same figure was less than a thirtieth of that. It is disclosed, it is real, and under the accounting standards it is not debt.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun went through the recent financial statements and related documents of Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon, Meta and Oracle and added those obligations up. The total came to 1.65 trillion dollars, around 1.5 trillion euros, an eightfold rise in about four years. The five companies' actual recorded debt is 1.35 trillion dollars. The commitments that sit outside the balance sheet are now larger than the ones inside it.
Meta alone accounts for about 420 billion dollars of the total, close to three times its transparent debt. These are not projections or analyst estimates of future spending. They are signed contracts: data-centre leases, server orders, and graphics processing units bought but not yet delivered.
How a gigawatt of compute stays off the books
The mechanism is dull and that is why it works. A lease liability is recognised when the asset is handed over or begins operating, not when the contract is signed. A data centre under construction in 2026 that opens in 2028 produces two years of obligation with no corresponding line in the accounts. The same applies to GPU purchase contracts for units the vendor has ordered and not received. Until delivery, the commitment lives in the footnotes of the quarterly report.
There is a second judgement doing quiet work. Lease accounting only captures extension periods and residual value guarantees when renewal is reasonably certain. AI hardware cycles are short, so the vendors argue that renewal is not reasonably certain, and the extensions drop out of the recognised liability. That argument is legitimate. It is also an admission worth reading twice.
Moody's has put a number on the narrower slice. Future data-centre lease commitments across the same five companies come to 662 billion dollars, roughly 610 billion euros, and that unrecorded amount equals 113 percent of their most recent adjusted debt. The agency expects data-centre capital expenditure across the sector to reach 500 billion dollars in 2026 and warns that as these leases move onto balance sheets, adjusted debt rises and financial flexibility falls. Morgan Stanley flagged the growth in data-centre lease contracts as a major risk factor in an investor report. Two institutions with no shared incentive arrived at the same concern.
El Paso, and the structure that repeats
The mechanism is easiest to see in a single deal. BlackRock is selling more than 12 billion dollars, around 11 billion euros, of bonds to finance a Meta data-centre campus in El Paso, Texas. The debt is issued by a holding company for BlackRock's 80 percent stake in the project vehicle, Project Sopaipilla Holdings. Meta holds the other 20 percent and is the anchor tenant. JPMorgan and Morgan Stanley were mandated to arrange investor calls, with pricing expected within days.
Read the ownership split carefully. Meta gets the capacity and does not carry the construction cost. The bondholders carry the asset. Meta carries a lease. And that lease, until the campus operates, is a footnote.
This is not a loophole anyone is hiding. It is disclosed, audited and increasingly standard, which is precisely the problem for a buyer: the structure is invisible in the metric most procurement teams actually look at. A vendor comparison built on reported leverage will rank these companies in the wrong order.
Why a pre-committed cost becomes your price floor
The solvency question is not the interesting one for a European operator. These are large companies with real cash generation and the ratings agencies are describing risk, not distress. The consequence that reaches your budget is narrower and more certain: a contractual obligation that must be recovered sets a floor under the price it is recovered through.
Capacity that has been ordered and paid for gets sold whether or not demand arrives on schedule. That sounds like it should mean discounts, and in the short run it can. Over the length of a three-year enterprise agreement it means the opposite. A vendor with 1.65 trillion dollars of pre-committed spend has very little room to absorb a soft quarter through pricing, because the obligation does not soften with it. The flexibility that used to show up as aggressive renewal terms is already spent.
The second inference is more useful and almost nobody is drawing it. The vendors have formally judged that renewal of these leases is not reasonably certain. That judgement is made site by site. It is, in accounting language, a statement about which capacity they are prepared to walk away from. If you are choosing a region for a workload with a five-year life, the vendor's own lease-recognition treatment is a better signal of that site's expected longevity than any roadmap slide you will be shown.
Read the note, not the balance sheet
The practical change to your process is small and it takes about twenty minutes per vendor. Open the most recent quarterly report, go to the commitments and contingencies note, and find the undiscounted lease payments not yet commenced. That figure, not the debt line, is the vendor's real forward commitment. Compare it against the same vendor's disclosure a year earlier. The direction of travel matters more than the level.
Then set your own term against it. If a vendor is recovering obligations over a period longer than your contract, you are the flexible party in the relationship and should be paid for it in the terms. If your contract runs longer than the vendor's committed recovery window on the capacity serving you, you are exposed to a repricing you cannot see coming. Under IFRS 16 the same disclosure logic applies to the European entities you contract with, so the note is available on both sides of the Atlantic.
None of this requires a view on whether the AI build-out pays off. It requires only that you stop reading the wrong number. The debt line describes what these companies borrowed. The footnote describes what they promised. Your renewal is priced off the second one.
Read next: The Largest AI Campus Builds Its Own Power Plant | A Fourth Cloud Giant Just Got More Plausible



