Four Analysts, One Number, Different Methods

Wood Mackenzie's finding, as reported by Bloomberg on August 12, 2026, is specific rather than directional: of 1,066 gigawatts of data center interconnection requests sitting in US grid operator queues, only about 28 percent, 298 gigawatts, is likely to be committed to actual service. Wood Mackenzie's Global Head of Grid Edge, Ben Hertz-Shargel, told Bloomberg that much of the planned capacity belongs to new developers with a small number of massive, speculative projects, disproportionately targeting the South and Southwest. A parallel summary of the same analysis, published the same day, broke the number down further: about 12 percent of requests already carry firm service commitments, with another 17 percent rated likely to proceed, together landing close to Wood Mackenzie's headline 28 percent from the opposite direction. PJM, which serves 67 million people from Illinois to Virginia, has itself committed to serve roughly twice as much new large-load demand as its planned generation can support, the clearest sign that even the operator managing the queue cannot yet tell which requests are real.

The Wood Mackenzie number did not stand alone for long. Bernstein analyst Madison Rezaei published a report the same week, titled Data Center Pipeline Probabilities: Separating the credible developers from dudes with PowerPoints, that scored only 33 percent of a 492 gigawatt dataset, 135 gigawatts, as credible using its own criteria. Rystad Energy's Reid Ramdathsingh reached a regional version of the same finding, rating roughly half of PJM's queue as credible against only 14 percent of Texas's, a gap that lines up with Texas's own 474 gigawatts of requests, about 90 percent of it from data centers and more than five times the state's 91 gigawatt all-time peak demand. Rapidan Energy Group's Glenn Schwartz, working independently, put the nationwide buildable share at 20 to 30 percent. Four firms, using four different methods on four different datasets, converged on the same order of magnitude: somewhere between a fifth and a third of what has been requested will actually get built.

The Two Utility Tiers Already Living Inside the Same Queue

That convergence is already forcing real decisions, not just research notes. Exelon, which covers the Illinois-to-Delaware stretch of the PJM grid, cut its own data center interconnection pipeline by roughly 40 percent in July 2026, keeping an 11 gigawatt queue it considers credible and discarding the rest without waiting for a regulator to force the question. In Texas, Governor Greg Abbott ordered ERCOT and the Public Utility Commission on August 3 to audit every pending data center project, pausing new approvals until the review is complete and citing an estimated 13 billion dollars in revenue at risk if the wrong projects get prioritized. Hut 8 Corp's SVP of Energy, Brad Richter, described the mood among developers now hearing utilities say they don't have it anymore: many territories are, in his words, closed for business. Halcyon co-founder Alex Klaessig put it more plainly: everyone's trying to figure out the rules of the road, and Cloverleaf Infrastructure's Brian Janous has floated a first-ready, first-served allocation model as one candidate for what those rules should be.

What this week's coverage understated is that some utilities never waited for a rule change to write their own. Dominion Energy and Appalachian Power in Virginia have required, under policies in force since 2025, that data center developers pay for 60 to 80 percent of contracted demand regardless of whether they draw it, and Rappahannock Electric Cooperative goes further, requiring collateral on top of payment for the full contracted load. Camus Energy CEO Astrid Atkinson has estimated interconnection requests run five to ten times the number of data centers that actually get built, and former Texas Public Utility Commissioner Karl Rabago summarized the underlying economics in one line: when it's cheaper to buy a queue position than not to use it, developers will buy. Utilities that priced that incentive out of existence in 2025 are now sitting on a queue that already screens itself. Utilities that did not are the ones doing 40 percent culls in July and emergency audits in August.

What a Signed Interconnection Agreement Is Actually Worth

The number every outlet led with this week, 72 percent phantom, is a national average, and averages hide the variable that actually matters to anyone holding a queue position today: which utility is on the other side of the agreement. In a Dominion, Appalachian Power, or Rappahannock-style territory, a signed interconnection agreement already reflects a developer who has put real money behind it, 60 to 100 percent of contracted demand plus collateral, so the queue is smaller and closer to the buildable 28 percent by construction. In a territory that has not adopted an equivalent policy, a signed agreement is one paper commitment among many, indistinguishable on paper from the phantom load around it, until the utility performs its own cull on its own schedule, the way Exelon did with no advance warning in July or Texas is now doing under an August 3 gubernatorial order. A developer, co-location buyer, or infrastructure investor evaluating a queue position in 2026 should ask one question before treating any signed agreement as bankable: has this utility already converted the phantom-load risk into an upfront financial requirement, or is it still processing speculative paper at face value.

The same asymmetry follows the money in the other direction. Interconnection studies and early transmission planning cost real capital regardless of whether the underlying project is ever built, and in a hardened territory that cost is substantially covered by the deposits and minimum payments developers already put down. In a territory still processing requests at face value, the planning and study costs sunk into the share of the queue that eventually gets withdrawn, on Wood Mackenzie's math most of it, have nowhere else to land except a future rate case spread across the same regional customers this whole debate is supposedly protecting. The states moving fastest to hardened, collateral-backed interconnection rules are not just filtering out phantom demand for the sake of tidier queues; they are also the ones keeping ratepayers out of a bill nobody has agreed who should pay.